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What to do about Inequality? Public Opinion Support for the European Union 
and Further European Integration in the Republic of Ireland    
 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper investigates individual’s perceptions of inequality and the 
impact this has on mass public opinion support for the European Union (EU) in the 
Republic of Ireland. This question is posed in the context of the onset of the economic 
and financial crisis of 2007/8 as the crisis can be regarded as a critical juncture in 
Ireland’s relationship with the EU as a result of the economic downturn and the 
widening of economic disparities individuals have experienced. Ireland is a critical 
case in examining EU support as since its accession to the EU in 1973 it is often 
considered an exemplar of what the EU could offer small member states with a 
strongly pro-integrationist mass public. Using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple 
regression analysis on 2009 European Election Study (EES) data, this paper shows 
that individuals’ concerns about inequality lowers support for the EU as it is currently 
constituted, but increases support for continued European integration. This suggests 
that individual-levels of support may be in a precarious state, yet they can be salvaged 
as individuals in Ireland regard the EU as the institutional-driving force to address 
market-generated inequality.  
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1. INTRODUCTION  
Recent trends suggest that the EU citizenry is becoming more critical of the 
EU (Franklin, Van der Eijk & Marsh 1995; Anderson & Reichert 1995; Norris 1999; 
Bringear & Jolly 2005; De Vreese & Boomgaarden 2005; Eichenberg & Dalton 2007; 
Loveless 2010; Rohrschneider & Loveless 2010; Kuhn & Stoeckel 2014). Following 
the 2007/8 financial crisis, there is a greater percentage of individuals who may not be 
objectively ‘poor’ but feel themselves to be at a heightened risk of economic adversity 
as a result of rising inequality and economic problems in both their respective 
member state and the EU. These individuals are likely to be more supportive of 
income redistribution as a means to minimize their own economic insecurity. While 
these preferences for increased economic security may not be unexpected, what this 
would produce in terms of changes in support for the EU project is unclear. 
Using the European Election Study (EES) 2009 survey dataset in Ireland and 
conducting an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) multiple regression analysis this paper 
shows the importance individuals place on addressing inequality is positively 
correlated with support for further European integration but not for the EU as it is 
currently constituted (i.e. status quo). This is important as it informs our 
understanding of popular support for the EU in Ireland. What is notable about these 
findings is that there is little evidence that this effect is a direct function of economic 
‘winning and losing’ via individual’s socio-economic status (Gabel 1998a, 1998b). 
Moreover, economic losing and its assumed negative effects on support for the EU 
may be more nuanced and widespread. Overall, individuals in Ireland are 
disappointed by the current performance of the EU and express concerns about 
economic conditions particularly those who experience increased economic instability 
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and insecurity. However, these individuals also appear to be more supportive of the 
EU in the future.  
I propose the following understanding for individual’s attitudes towards the 
EU in Ireland. While the EU has long been, an economic project coupled with a 
normative democratic framework, the evidence here suggests that support for the EU 
in Ireland moves with a desire for democratic politics to play a more stabilizing role 
in the economy. Following the economic crisis of 2007/8, even if the EU is seen to 
have failed to create adequate economic and social opportunities or has provided 
these prospects in an unequal manner, EU membership may still represent assurance 
that both economic and political institutions can work effectively. In addition to 
traditionally identified groups of ‘losers’ these ‘new losers’ appear to be supportive of 
the EU as a means to buttress democratic power at both the national and supranational 
level based on the belief that democracy is the mechanism to combat market-
generated inequalities. This suggests that the EU should reflect Irish individuals’ 
preferences for fairness and justice in society via strong and effective democratic 
institutions that function to diminish excessive market distortions.  
2. IRISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS THE EU  
 
Ireland is often regarded as one of the most enthusiastic supporters of 
European integration since its accession to the EU in 1973 as they are often 
considered as ‘good Europeans’ with a pro-integrationist attitude (Sinnott 1995, 
Sinnott 2002, Gilland 2002; Sinnott 2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 2006; Kennedy & 
Sinnott 2007; Lyons 2008; Adshead & Tonge 2009). However, the reality of Irish 
public opinion is more nuanced: support for the EU in Ireland is not a single entity, 
but a complex set of opinions determined by a variety of factors. Research has shown 
that since the 1990’s knowledge about the EU amongst the Irish public is low (Gary, 
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Marsh & Sinnott 2005; Holmes 2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 2006; Kennedy & Sinnott 
2007; Laffan & O’Mahony 2008 pp. 128) with individuals in Ireland more likely to 
refer to the economic aspects of the EU, such as the freedom of movement, the Euro 
and economic prosperity. This ‘knowledge deficit’ is perhaps not surprising as for the 
first twenty years of EU membership Ireland’s self-perception of its status within the 
EU was that of a small, poor, peripheral member state. In their examination of the 
nuances of Irish public opinion toward the EU Kennedy and Sinnott (2007) find that 
Irish individuals’ knowledge of the EU does not affect the relationship between 
opinion of EU support and evaluations of domestic and European institutions. 
Therefore, the EU project in Ireland is not one which can be encapsulated by a single 
overarching judgment, but by many different facets.  
Between 1972 and 2012, Irish governments have held nine European 
referendum campaigns. The emergence of referendums as key forums for debate 
about the EU in Ireland has resulted in a much greater degree of polarisation of 
opinions with Gary, Marsh and Sinnott (2005) and Glencross and Trechsel (2011) 
demonstrating that voting in EU-related referendums typically distinguish between 
‘second-order’ effects and the impact of ‘substantive ‘issues’. As Garry (2013) 
correctly points out, findings with regards to both ‘second-order’ and ‘issue-voting’ 
approaches are of significant theoretical importance for the understanding of 
individual-level political behaviour and normative evaluations of the practicality of 
using the mechanism of referendums to ratify EU treaties. While both approaches are 
important for the wider debate they are opaque and difficult approaches to adopt when 
examining individual-level mass public opinion attitudes towards the EU in Ireland. 
Overall, they deflect from a thorough examination of individual-level normative 
attitudes towards support for the EU in Ireland. From this, it is evident that the EU is 
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an economic project combined with a democratic normative framework suggesting 
that support for the EU shifts with a desire for politics, in particular political 
institutions, to play a robust role in stabilising the economy and this addressing 
inequality since the onset of the economic crisis in 2007/8.  
3. INEQUALITY AND SUPPORT FOR EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
The economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 can be regarded as a critical 
juncture in Ireland’s relationship with the EU, as a result of the economic downturn 
and a widening of economic disparities individuals have experienced. Individuals and 
labour market participants perceive the costs and benefits of European integration 
differently depending upon national wage bargaining systems of welfare state policies 
(Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004). In particular, “domestic political divides between 
advocates and opponents of EU integration may play out differently and yield 
contrasting partisan alignments if polities are embedded in different institutional 
‘varieties’ of capitalism” (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, p.62).  
Capitalist institutions affect the proportion of voters in each EU member state 
who have an incentive to challenge European integration. It is the political economy 
which shapes the ‘grievance level’ that may deliver the patterns of domestic 
contestation (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt 2004, pp. 62) by focusing upon individuals’ 
socio-tropic evaluations of European integration as well as the cost and benefits that 
result from changes in the expected economic benefits created by European 
integration for national political and economic institutions. In addition, individuals’ 
focus on egocentric voting preferences for European integration is not based on 
whether individuals are ‘left’ or ‘right’ in ideological terms, but whether they are 
‘left’ or ‘right’ within their national political-economic context. The ‘varieties of 
capitalism’ literature suggests that the economic crisis has affected liberal market 
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economies more severely than coordinated market economies (Chari & Bernhagen, 
2011; Bernhagen & Chari, 2011). Therefore, when analysing Ireland through the lens 
of ‘varieties of capitalism’ it is individuals’ preferences to be either ‘left’ or ‘right’ in 
terms of the national political-economic context and the contextualisation that liberal 
market economies have been affected more since the onset of the economic crisis 
which are important in determining individuals’ attitudes to address inequality and 
how they subsequently influence support for the EU.  
The onset of the 2007/8 economic crisis and the Irish context highlights the 
heightened risk of economic adversity for individuals as a result of rising economic 
problems in both Ireland and the EU. These individuals are likely to be more 
supportive of income distribution as a means to minimize their own economic 
insecurity. The focus on European integration is now towards a more individualist 
egocentric perspective. The theoretical mechanism linking institutions and Irish 
individuals’ assessments of EU integration is the “perception of costs and benefits 
accruing from integration in light of domestic capitalist institutions” (Brinegar, Jolly 
& Kitschelt 2004, p. 64). When assessing the economic crisis, individuals consider its 
impact on their country’s economy. An EU member state’s status as a net beneficiary 
of European transfers (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993; Anderson & Reichert 1995; 
Carrubba 1997) and intra-European trade (Anderson & Reichert 1995) are important 
determinants of EU support. Indicators of macro-economic growth, inflation and 
unemployment influence aggregate EU support (Anderson & Kaltenhaler 1996). 
Since Ireland is a net beneficiary of EU transfers it is plausible that individuals in 
Ireland base their opinion of the EU upon the implications for the national economy.  
European integration now differs from European integration pre-economic 
crisis. While European integration has primarily focused upon market liberalization, 
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European economic governance now operates in a different direction by imposing 
regulation and increased (supranational) oversight on banks and markets (Kuhn & 
Stoeckel 2014, p. 625). The beginning of the economic crisis of 2007/8 hinges upon 
this pre- and post- phase of European integration in Ireland and as a result it is 
expected to lead to a resurgence in Gabel’s (1995, 1997; 1998a & 1998b) ‘winners’ 
and ‘losers’ thesis. This resurgence derives from the onset of the economic and 
financial crisis of 2007/8 and continuing economic recession in Europe, which has 
created a new group of ‘losers’ in the EU project. This new group of ‘losers’ 
continues to be socio-economically secure but it includes those individuals who 
perceive themselves to be pushed closer to the economic edge of ‘losing’. Put simply, 
following the 2007/8 economic crisis there is a greater percentage of people in Ireland 
who may not be objectively ‘poor’, but who feel themselves to be at a heightened risk 
of economic adversity due to rising inequality and economic problems in Ireland and 
the EU. These individuals are likely to be more supportive of income redistribution as 
a means to minimize their own economic insecurity.  
This is vital for the understanding of individuals’ changing support for the EU 
in Ireland. The extensive nature of individuals’ support for the EU in Ireland suggests 
that the EU should reflect EU citizens’ preferences for fairness and justice in society 
via strong and effective democratic institutions. These institutions will then act and 
function in order to diminish excessive market distortions. It appears that, following 
the economic crisis of 2007/8, if the EU is regarded by individuals to have failed to 
create adequate and social opportunities, or has provided these prospects in an 
unequal manner, membership of the EU may still represent assurance for individuals 
that both economic and political institutions can and will work effectively in order to 
address inequality.  
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In Ireland, the European integration project has for many years been motivated 
by economic objectives based upon utilitarian factors. The Irish tendency has 
followed a stance of “not what the country could do for Europe, but what Europe 
could do for the country” (Holmes 2005 p. 2). Ireland has adopted a highly practical 
approach to European integration and has acquired a reputation of being supportive of 
European integration while also acquiring one of a ‘begging bowl’ mentality 
operating in a reactive self-interest manner (Matthews 1983; Hussey 1993).  As a 
result, the most extensively analysed economic variables influencing attitudes towards 
integration in Ireland are factors such as the level of unemployment, inflation and net 
receipts, or payments, from the EU (Anderson & Reichert 1996; Gabel & Whitten 
1997; Garry, Marsh & Sinnott 2005; Kennedy & Sinnott 2006; Laffan & O’Mahony 
2008; Loveless 2010).  
The boom years of the Celtic Tiger (1995 – 2007) saw increased levels of 
income inequality as the top section of the income distribution pulled away from the 
median and by 2007, the average levels of income inequality over the Celtic Tiger 
period remained stubbornly high (Dellepaine & Hardiman 2012, p. 86).  The rapid 
growth and employment expansion combined with an on-going commitment to Social 
Partnership1 processes did not contribute to a reduction in domestic social inequalities 
or to an expansion in the extent of social consumption. The increase in public 
spending that took place did not keep pace with market-driven living standards and 
the tax system favoured, rather than contained, the surge in higher income rewards 
(Ibid, p. 87).  
																																																								
1 Social Partnership is the term used for the tripartite, triennial national pay agreements reached in 
Ireland. The process was initiated in 1987 after a period of high inflation and weak economic growth. 
This led to increased emigration and unsustainable government borrowing and national debt. Strike and 
wage moderation have been important outcomes of the Social Partnership agreements and are seen as a 
significant contributor to the Celtic Tiger.  
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In order to bring this in to the understanding of citizens’ support for the EU, it 
is the connection between individuals’ concerns about inequality and the changes in 
individuals’ level of support for the EU through the relationship inequality has to both 
political institutions and the liberal market economy. I do not posit that individuals in 
Ireland want an alternative arrangement with political democracy and the free market 
economy of the EU, but rather that individuals in Ireland want democratic institutions 
and the liberal market economy to both function effectively (Rohrschneider and 
Whitefield, 2006). It is much more productive to consider the market and democracy 
as mutually enforcing mechanisms so that the liberal market economy can produce 
improved economic outcomes for a larger proportion of individuals in Ireland in 
conjunction with robust and efficient democratic institutions.  
If an economy provides high living standards and dynamic economic 
development, individuals will accept objective levels of inequality (Bollen and 
Jackman 1985). This makes the balance between market-generated inequalities and 
effective democratic institutions a plausible argument as states with strong democratic 
political institutions are regarded by individuals as the guarantor against excessive 
inequalities (Bollen and Jackman 1985; Reuveny and Li 2003; Szelenyi and Kostello 
1996; Whitefield and Loveless 2013). When economies fail, democratic political 
institutions must work. Therefore, I propose that in the wake of the economic and 
financial crisis, the EU may be regarded as a potential guarantor of democracy that 
can, as one of its many functions, combat market-driven inequalities. 
This analysis does not overturn Gabel’s (1995, 1997; 1998a & 1998b) work 
but in fact expands the definition of ‘loser’. I expect that traditional winners and 
losers of EU integration will continue to reflect long-standing preferences for the EU. 
However, in conjunction, I also expect that those concerned about economic 
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conditions will reflect a cross-current of determinants of support for the EU project.  
Thus, theoretically, I suggest that those who have been moved towards greater 
economic insecurity (i.e. the new losers) see democracy as the key mechanism to 
combat market-generated inequalities. Therefore, rather than reflect the anti-EU of the 
sociodemographic ‘losing’ profile, the expectation is that that those individuals 
concerned about economic insecurity, the potential ‘new losers’ are more supportive 
of the EU as a means to reinforce democratic power at the national and supranational 
level. I hypothesize that as the level of individuals’ preferences for inequality to be 
addressed increases, individuals are more likely to support the EU and its continued 
integration. I also note that if concerns with inequality are driven by the desire to see 
the economic costs of inequality mitigated through democratic means, support for the 
EU will only benefit if the EU is perceived to have performed well. If the EU has not 
performed well, I expect to see a loss of support for current performance.  
4. METHODOLOGY  
Increased support for the EU and the continuation of the EU project suggest 
that individuals in Ireland regard the EU as the enforcer of democratic political 
institutions which appeal to justice, fairness and transparency. Decreased support for 
the EU is considered in conjunction with increased concerns by individuals in Ireland 
of the ability of the EU to address inequality. This is suggestive of the on-going battle 
with the perceived democratic deficit of the EU, concerns of the efficacy of the EU 
and a preference for the Irish government to be the basis of effective action against 
inequality. In any of these latter cases, Irish individuals’ concerns with inequality 
depress support for the EU. The theory that combines Irish individuals’ concern about 
addressing inequality with support for the EU and Irish national governance rests on 
the notion that citizens in Ireland seek strong democratic politics to serve as a	
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safeguard against market-generated inequalities (Szelenyi & Kostello 1996; Reuveny 
& Li 2003; Whitefield & Loveless 2012). This leads to the hypothesis that;  
Hypothesis 1: In Ireland, as the level of individuals’ preferences for inequality to be 
addressed increases, Irish individuals are more likely to support the EU (EU Status 
quo) and continued expansion (EU Enlargement) 
To operationalize this hypothesis, I use the EES 2009 data2 to examine support 
for the EU (see Appendix for all data and variables). Boomgaarden, Schuck, Elenbaas 
and De Vreese (2011) argue that attitudes towards the EU are multidimensional, 
making it relevant to assess which generic models explain variation in support or 
aversion to the different dimensions of EU support. Boomgaarden et al (2011) argue 
that measures of EU attitudes refer to two clusters of EU attitude orientations. The 
first cluster relates to specific, utilitarian and output oriented attitudes, while the 
second relates to diffuse, affective and input oriented attitudes.  
In this paper, I also distinguish between attitudes towards the regime and 
towards the community by separating EU support into two categories: the EU status 
quo and EU enlargement. This builds upon the findings of Boomgaarden et al (2011) 
that emotional responses (i.e. perceptions), along with the performance of the 
functioning of the EU, both democratically and economically strengthens utilitarian 
attitudes towards the EU and reflects support based on agreement with extended 
decision-making competencies, policy transfer and further European integration. 
Therefore, in order to test the robustness of the approach I include three of them here:  
																																																								
2 It was intended to use EES 2014 data in conjunction with EES 2009 in order to examine change in 
attitudes towards the EU since the onset of, and after, the economic and financial crisis. However, 
using 2014 European Election Studies (EES) data is problematic and analytically hazardous owing to 
changes in the nature and the availability of many of the necessary variables. Only half of the 
dependent variables are included, more than half (56 per cent) of the independent variables are 
operationally different, while 19 per cent are missing entirely. This introduces substantial opportunity 
for both measurement error and omitted variable bias. Therefore, regrettably the OLS Multiple 
Regression model was not conducted with EES 2014 data.  
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1) EU membership is good or bad 
2) EU enlargement is good or bad  
3) EU is in our interest  
Using OLS Multiple Regression analysis3, I run three models of EU support in 
order to test the theoretical mechanism that individuals in Ireland seek strong 
democratic politics to serve as a safeguard against market-generated inequalities since 
the onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. This necessitates the 
inclusion of ‘addressing inequality’ into the mass public opinion model thus 
examining the performance of all three models in Ireland immediately after the onset 
of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8. 
5. RESULTS 
Table 1 shows the co-variation of the three dependent variables. Each 
dependent variable varies from one another yet none of the three variables are 
substantively correlated with one another. This suggests the importance of 
operationalization due to the conceptual distinctiveness between the EU as it is 
currently constituted (i.e. EU Status Quo), and the continued expansion of the EU 
project (i.e. EU Enlargement).  
<<Table 1 about here>> 
There are numerous approaches to the understanding of EU support (Loveless 
& Rohrschneider 2008). The standard model of EU support includes communication 																																																								
3 OLS Multiple Regression analysis is the most widely used type of regression to incorporate two or 
more explanatory variables (i.e. the focus in this analysis on the central independent variable of 
inequality) in a prediction equation for a response variable (i.e. support for the EU). OLS Multiple 
Regression modelling is a mainstay of statistical analysis as a result of its power and flexibility to 
estimate complex models with large numbers of variables as demonstrated in the analysis here. All 
categorical/ordinal variables in the analysis are treated as continuous variables. Treating the variables 
in this way produced substantively the same findings in both models (OLS Multiple Regression and the 
Ordered Logistic Regression). Please see appendix for further details.  
An Ordered Logistic Regression model is also conducted using EES 2009 data. The findings from the 
Ordered Logistic Regression model produced substantively the same findings as the OLS Multiple 
Regression model and thus for ease of interpretation only OLS Multiple Regression findings are 
discussed here. Please see appendix for Ordered Logistic Regression findings.  
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(social communication, watching mass media and interest in politics), identity 
(feeling about being described as European, and fear of immigrants), ideological 
congruence and institutional performance (including retrospective and prospective 
socio-tropic economic evaluations as well as normative preferences for the liberal 
market economy and satisfaction with democracy), and socio-demographic variables 
(including self-reported social class, subjective standard of living, age, gender, 
ideology, and education). 
For the central independent variable concerning inequality, I ask this question 
in the context of the onset of the economic crisis therefore constructing the conceptual 
basis for inequality in the fundamental premise that inequality is generated by market 
economies and democratic institutions are expected to balance the power of economic 
elite widely dispersed political power (Bartels 2008; Kaltenhaler et al. 2008)4. Thus, I 
base my understanding on existing underlying normative attitudes that the market 
should be fair (vs. purely equal) and democracy should function in a roughly 
egalitarian, or minimally majoritarian, manner to combat excessive and inevitable 
market distortions (Whitefield & Loveless 2013) in Ireland.   
To operationalize this rationale, individual respondents in Ireland were asked 
how they deem the importance of addressing inequality to be using the question 
“income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people”5. I take this to 
be a value position that demonstrates individual respondents’ support for democratic 
institutions to serve as the arbiter of liberal market generated inequality. In order to 
show that this measure of inequality is not a proxy for other value positions and can 
be independently predictive of support for the EU, I analyse how the variable of 																																																								
4 More generally, popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy tends to produces a desire 
for more, rather than less, democracy (Dalton 2004; Norris 1999).  
5 Note that the question here asks ‘Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people’ 
making no reference to country, party or specific policy.  
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inequality correlates with both ideological and socio-economic positions. The 
hypothesis, meanwhile, relies on the assumption that individuals in Ireland, regard the 
EU as a mechanism to reinforce substantive democratic governance at both the 
national level (i.e. Ireland) and at the supranational level (i.e. the EU). The analysis 
demonstrates that an increased number of individuals in Ireland concerned about 
inequality lowers support for the EU as it is currently constituted (i.e. status quo) but 
increases support for deeper European integration. This wide-ranging effect is for the 
most part unrelated to individuals’ socio-economic status of ‘winning’ and ‘losing’ 
but is driven by normative values of fairness and justice in society, suggesting that 
individuals in Ireland believe that is the institutional driving force to address market 
generated inequality in Ireland. 
<<Table 2 about here>>  
Across all three models of EU support the theoretically relevant variables of 
inequality, ideological congruence and institutional performance perform well. The 
central independent variable of ‘address inequality’ is positively correlated with both 
‘EU enlargement’ and ‘EU in Ireland’s interests’. This infers that individuals believe 
that further enlargement of the EU, and the fact that decisions made in the EU are in 
the interest of Ireland, are factors which increase the need to address market generated 
inequality and as a consequence this increases mass public opinion support for the 
EU. However, in the model ‘EU membership is good or bad’ the central independent 
variable of ‘address inequality’ is negatively correlated and is not statistically 
significant. This suggests that inequality, or rather individuals’ belief that inequality 
should be addressed, has no effect on whether Ireland’s membership of the EU is 
either a good or bad thing.  
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Nonetheless, given the concern of individuals in Ireland about the issue of 
inequality and its apparent and differential effect on support for the EU since the 
onset of the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 it is evident that inequality is a 
meaningful political, rather than merely economic, issue and one that needs 
substantive consideration. For individuals in Ireland, evaluations of support for the 
EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with many Irish people believing that the 
liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal 
differences based upon both access and opportunity to the EU. This is reiterated 
theoretically by the ideological and institutional performance variables as they are 
almost uniformly positive and as expected.  
In testing the theoretical mechanism, prospective socioeconomic evaluation 
and satisfaction with democracy are the best performing ideological congruence and 
institutional performance variables. Prospective socioeconomic evaluation is 
positively correlated with ‘EU membership’ and satisfaction with democracy 
positively correlated across all three models as well as being statistically significant 
across all three models. This further demonstrates that Irish individuals’ evaluations 
of support for the EU are not only economic but socio-tropic with many individuals in 
Ireland believing that the liberal market system functions in an unfair and unjust 
manner as they assess societal differences based upon both access and opportunity to 
the EU. This is a noteworthy finding given the intense criticism successive Irish 
governments have encountered since the economic crisis of 2007/8, with scholars 
citing a lack of expertise and inadequate governance as contributors to Irish socio-
economic inequalities (Kirby & Murphy 2011; Dellepaine & Hardiman 2012). 
Overall, the ‘identity’ variables are perhaps the most consistent predictor of 
support for the EU in Ireland as ‘European identity’ is positively correlated across all 
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three models. The statistical significance and correlation coefficients across all three 
dependent variables for ‘European identity’ and across two models (EU membership 
and EU Enlargement) for ‘cultural fear’ emphasises the paradox that despite the fact 
that individuals in Ireland are widely regarded as ‘good Europeans with a pro-
integrationist attitude’ there remains a nationalistic sentiment in Ireland. This is 
concurrent with the notion of perceived cultural threats (McLaren 2002 & 2004) and 
the inherent and implied ethnic level of Irish identity (Gilland, 2002). 
For the socio-demographic variables, I note that similar to findings on support 
for the EU in the twenty-seven member states the reliance on Gabel’s (Gabel 1998a & 
1998b) ‘winners and losers’ thesis on static demographic variables may be 
deteriorating. The richer, younger, more educated males in Ireland no longer appear to 
regard the EU and further European integration as a net positive. Despite tending in a 
positive direction, as expected, education, age, self-reported social class, and 
subjective standard of living in Ireland are not statistically significant across all three 
models and are thus not powerful predictors in gauging EU support in Ireland.  
Ideology provides limited consistency, as those individuals in Ireland who 
subscribe to the left of the political spectrum are less likely to support for the EU. Yet, 
those individuals who identify with the farthest right position are supportive of the 
EU, believing that the EU acts in Ireland’s interest. These are the most-opaque 
findings and at first glance may appear counterintuitive. However, one may posit that 
the negative support for the EU from individuals on the left, and positive support for 
the EU from those on the right, is indicative of a clear market position – note the 
strong positive effects of individuals’ prospective socioeconomic evaluation and 
membership of the EU. Therefore, it may be considered that both individuals on the 
left and the right support the EU such that those on the left would prefer to see more 
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democracy and those on the right would rather a continuation of the EU’s apparent 
market profile. Overall this is an illustration of individuals’ normative view of 
inequality and that those individuals on the right support an increase in EU 
involvement in Irish economic governance as the EU is operating and functioning in 
the interest of Ireland by improving the liberal market position of Ireland, and 
therefore Irish individuals’ position in the market during the economic crisis. Put 
simply, individuals acknowledge that the EU is acting as the institutional driving 
force to address market-generated inequality in Ireland.  
This conclusion is not unwarranted given the individual-level findings for the 
inequality variable. As individuals in Ireland agree with the notion that income and 
wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people, support for the EU increases. 
This is consistent with the theoretical expectation. Individuals’ attitudes towards 
addressing inequality increases support for the EU, therefore lending support to the 
theoretical notion that EU citizens regard the EU as a means to reinforce substantive 
democratic governance at both the nation state level in Ireland and within the EU 
itself, namely as a means to combat excessive inequality.  
6. DISCUSSION  
The economic and financial crisis had a profound immediate effect on the 
economic welfare of EU citizens (Eurofound Report, 2012). If the EU is regarded as 
primarily a market promoter via integration of national economies, it is reasonable to 
expect that those that are pushed, or perhaps those who perceive themselves and 
others to be pushed, towards a more fragile personal economic condition may be all 
the more critical of the EU and ongoing European integration. Kriesi et al (2008) 
argue that competition which is guided by changes in the economy, cultural diversity, 
competition between national governments and perceived encroachment of 
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supranational politics have driven European societies in the theorized directions of 
Gabel’s (1998a & 1998b) initial contribution over the past decades of EU expansion. 
However, ‘losers’ are not only ‘losers’ in continued European integration but also in 
the reduction of member states’ public sector capacity and a political willingness to 
continue the welfare state. The findings here demonstrate this highly plausible 
understanding in three ways.  
Firstly, Irish attitudes towards addressing inequality increases support for the 
EU, in particular for further European integration. This is an interesting and 
noteworthy finding and points to the perception that individuals in Ireland believe that 
the Irish political system has failed the Irish people in reducing and addressing 
inequality. The intervention by the Irish government in the form of the Bank 
Guarantee Scheme of 2008 did not create greater certainty or stability in economic 
markets, as initially hoped, and individuals in Ireland were not protected from the 
uncertainty and risk of the liberal market economy. Irish individuals have recognised 
this uncertainty and risk of the liberal market economy and have demonstrated a 
preference for ‘more’ Europe, not ‘less’ Europe. 
In order to link democratic institutions and Irish individuals’ perception of the 
unfair and unjust distribution of access and opportunity within the liberal market 
economy since the economic crisis to the understanding of individual-level support 
for the EU in Ireland, I draw a connection between Irish individuals’ concerns about 
inequality and changes in individual level support for the EU in Ireland. The findings 
here highlight that Irish individuals’ who want inequality to be addresses appear to be 
receptive to further European integration, while at the same time being dissatisfied 
with the EU’s current performance suggesting that the perceived ‘democratic deficit’ 
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in the EU does continue to reinforce previous concerns about European governance 
(Rohrschneider, 2002).  
However, popular dissatisfaction with the functioning of democracy tends to 
produce a desire for more, rather than less, democracy (Norris 1999; Dalton 2004). 
The findings here demonstrate that support for European integration via Irish 
individual’s concerns about addressing inequality suggests a prospective connection 
between the robust democratic enforcement that the EU could potentially offer. While 
not directly tested here, this suggests that the EU’s response to the crisis has been 
disproved by individuals in Ireland but despite this the EU has a positive role to play 
in addressing inequality. Whether the role to be played by the EU in addressing 
inequality supersedes the Irish nation state, or whether the EU’s role is one that 
reinforces the EU project, is opaque, ambiguous and difficult to discern. It may be 
conceived that the EU is being called upon in order to address inequality in a 
substantive manner, in addition to the action or inaction of the Irish state. 
It is difficult to assess whether it is either the EU or the Irish state that is 
perceived by individuals in Ireland as being primarily responsible for the stabilisation 
of financial and economic markets and domestic and international economics 
following the economic crisis. However, recent Eurobarometer data (Eurobarometer 
72, Autumn 2009 to Eurobarometer 80, Spring 2014) asks respondents: “In your 
opinion, which of the following is best able to take effective actions against the 
effects of the financial and economic crisis?”6 
 
<<Figure 1 about here>> 
 																																																								
6 Question QC3 in Eurobarometer 72 & 74, Question QB3a in Eurobarometer 73, Question QC3a in 
Eurobarometer 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, Question QC2a in Eurobarometer 80. Data unavailable for 
Eurobarometer 82 & 83.  Please see http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb_arch_en.htm  
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The individual-level responses are notable as individuals in Ireland regard the 
Irish state as much less effective in its action to manage the effects of the economic 
crisis since Spring 2010. It may be posited that for individuals in Ireland the question 
of effective action against the economic crisis may not have a clear answer. However, 
what is clear is that individuals in Ireland want more, not less EU democratic action. 
This demonstrates that the EU is indeed regarded by individuals in Ireland as the 
institutional driving force to address perceptions of inequality since the onset of the 
economic crisis. Here, inequality in the distribution of economic growth and or 
changes plays a strong role alongside Irish individuals’ actual socioeconomic status 
and social location acting as a determinant of Irish individuals’ support for on-going 
European integration, as well as an evaluative filter through which to assess the EU in 
its current form. When the liberal market distorts the distribution of goods in society, 
institutional remedies need to be available. If effective institutions are in fact the 
presumed remedy for inequality, analysis of changes in the level of support for the EU 
is possible, as well as a re-examination of the longstanding question of whether the 
EU may be valued more for its democratic character than its market character is 
possible which is directly demonstrated by the Eurobarometer data.  
Secondly, it is not simply those individuals who find themselves in a more 
precarious economic position whose concern about inequality affects their support for 
the EU project as evaluations are not only economic but also sociotropic 
(Rohrschneider & Loveless, 2010). Put simply, the system can be regarded as too 
unfair thus making inequality representative of this as individuals assess societal 
differences in access and opportunity to the EU. It is possible that an individual could 
support the notion that income and wealth should be redistributed and at the same 
time be satisfied with the level of inequality. However, this is highly likely to be a 
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small proportion of the population compared to those who are worried about 
inequality and support redistribution as concerns about inequality are strongly related 
to support for redistribution (Corneo & Gruner 2002; Kenworthy & McCall 2008; 
Rehm 2009; Finersaas 2012). The question throughout this analysis focuses on a 
normative preference for the EU project as opposed to a preference for a specific 
policy outcome. Therefore, the economic and financial crisis of 2007/8 has affected 
support for the EU and further European integration. The findings here demonstrate 
show that there is a widespread concern about inequality and the role of the EU 
(lower support for the EU as it is) as well as optimism for the EU project (support for 
further European integration) following the economic and financial crisis (Simpson 
and Loveless, 2016).  
Thirdly and finally, the findings here in relation to the need to address 
inequality demonstrate a better understanding of individual level support for the EU. 
By linking higher levels of concern for addressing inequality with lower support for 
the EU as it is and higher levels of concern for addressing inequality with further 
European integration it may be posited that democracy and or democratic norms are 
only one set of potential mechanisms why individuals in Ireland display positive 
support for the EU as this as is not directly tested in the modelling strategy. What the 
findings do indicate is that the underpinning values of fairness and justice via strong 
and effective democratic institutions and processes may drive perceptions of 
inequality in Irish society with EU membership being much more than mere 





7. CONCLUSION  
Overall the findings here suggest that individuals’ attitudes and orientations 
towards the EU in Ireland are undergoing a predominant shift.  The findings illustrate 
that individuals’ desire to address inequality is strongly correlated with negative 
support for the EU as it is, but positively correlated toward a deepening of EU 
integration. This finding depends on both individuals’ socio-economic location, 
making it a common explanation of support for the EU, as well as normatively 
supportive of stronger democratic institutional performance. This in turn allows an 
analysis of the changing nature and role of the EU in the eyes of the mass public of 
Ireland in light of many, new economic realities. 
European integration and governance have been centrally important in the 
economic transformation of Ireland, particularly through the alignment of state 
strategy with the action of economic and social interests. Given the current economic 
context, inequality not only heightens individual level concerns about economic 
stability, but it has also demonstrated that context, especially in the case of Ireland, is 
important and has directly influenced politics. As well as economic recovery, the 
majority of Irish individuals want an even distribution of growth (i.e. inequality 
should be addressed) and therefore by addressing inequality, democratic political 
institutions (i.e. in this case, the EU), should gain more support from Irish mass public 
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Table 1: Co-variation of EU Support Variables 
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Figure 1: Eurobarometer Responses for “Effective Action against the effects of 
















































Ordered Logistic Regression Model and Findings  
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An Ordered Logistic Regression model was also conducted using EES 2009 
data. The findings from the Ordered Logistic Regression model produced 
substantively the same findings as the OLS Multiple Regression model with the 
central independent variable of address inequality performing the same across all 
three models of EU support. When examining both models, in the Ordered Logistic 
Regression model, there are only six variables (out of seventeen) which do not 
produce the same correlation and only two variables (out of seventeen) which do not 
have the same statistical significance as the OLS Multiple Regression model.  
Only one of the Communication variables, (social communication is positively 
correlated with EU Good or Bad and EU in Ireland’s interests) diverges from the OLS 
Multiple Regression model but it is not statistically significant and thus has no impact 
on the findings. For the Ideological Congruence & Institutional Performance 
variables, prospective socioeconomic evaluation produces the most significant finding 
being statistically significant with EU in Ireland’s interest. While this is a welcome 
finding, it does not improve the Ordered Logistic Regression model or change the 
findings of the analysis overall as other variables such as market preference 
(positively correlated) and satisfaction with democracy (not statistically significant) 
do not harbour the same results as the OLS Multiple Regression model. For the Socio-
demographic variables, Age produces another significant finding (positively 
correlated and statistically significant) while Gender meanwhile is negatively 
correlated. Again, while the statistical significance of Age is a welcome finding, it 
does not change the findings of the analysis overall.  
It is important to note that the Ordered Logit model produces substantively the 
same findings as the OLS Multiple Regression model demonstrating that for 
individuals in Ireland, evaluations of support for the EU are not only economic but 
socio-tropic with many Irish people believing that the liberal market system functions 
in an unfair and unjust manner as they assess societal differences based upon both 
access and opportunity to the EU. This is reiterated by all of the theoretically relevant 















The European Election Studies (2009) is a replication of the 2004 surveys (and 
previous elections back to 1979) in all EU member countries. European Parliament 
Election Study 2009, Voter Study, Advance Release, 7 April 2010. European 





EU Membership: Good or bad (q79): Generally speaking, do you think that 
[country’s] membership of the European Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither 
good nor bad? RC: Good thing, Neither, Bad thing. Reverse coded to make findings 
intuitive, DK to missing. 
 
EU enlargement is good or bad (q83): In general, do you think that enlargement of 
the European Union would be a good thing, a bad thing, neither good nor bad. RC: 
Good thing, Neither, Bad thing. Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, DK to 
missing. 
 
EU in our interest (q91): How much confidence do you have that decisions made by 
the European Union will be in the interest of [country] is great deal of confidence, a 
fair amount, not very much, no confidence at all. Reverse coded to make findings 




Address Inequality (q63): Income and wealth should be redistributed towards 
ordinary people. RC: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. 
Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, DK/NA recoded to Neither. 
 
Communication: 
Social Communication (q18): How often talk to friends/family about election? 
Often, Sometimes, Never. Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, DK to 
missing. 
 
Mass Media (q16 + q17 + q20): How often watch program about election on TV 
(q16)/read about election in newspaper (q17)/ look into website concerned with 
election (q20) Often, Sometimes, Never. Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, 
DK to missing. Simple arithmetic sum of the three.  
 
Political Interest 
Interest in Politics (q78): To what extent would you say you are interested in 
politics? RC: Very, Somewhat, a little, not at all. Reverse coded to make findings 







European Identity (q82): Do you feel not only [country] citizen, but also a 
European citizen? RC: Nationality only, Nationality and European, European and 
Nationality, European only. DK to missing. 
 
Cultural Fear (q67): Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly. 
RC: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither, Disagree, Strongly Disagree. Reverse coded 
to make findings intuitive, DK/NA recoded to Neither. 
 
Ideological Congruence and Institutional Performance: 
Retrospective Sociotropic Economic Evaluation (q48): RC: A lot better, a little 
better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse. Reverse coded to make findings 
intuitive, DK to missing. 
 
Prospective Sociotropic Economic Evaluation (q49): RC: A lot better, a little 
better, stayed the same, a little worse, a lot worse. Reverse coded to make findings 
intuitive, DK to missing. 
 
Market preference (q57): Private enterprise best way to solve [country's] 
economic problems. RC: Strongly Agree, Agree, Neither, Disagree, Strongly 
Disagree. Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, DK/NA recoded to Neither. 
 
Satisfaction with Democracy (q84): How satisfied are you with democracy in 
[country]? RC: Very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, not at all satisfied. 
Reverse coded to make findings intuitive, DK to missing. 
 
Socio-Demographic Variables: 
Age (q103): Year of Birth. Transformed: 2009-q103 to give age.  
 
Gender (q102): Recoded 0=Female, 1=Male 
 
Left-Right Self-Placement (q46): RC: 0 Left – 10 Right. Coded into Left (0, 1, 2, 
3), Centre (4, 5, 6), and Right (7, 8, 9, 10) dummy variables. 
 
Education (v200): RC: ISCED (0) Pre-primary level of education;’ (1) Primary 
level of education; (2) Lower secondary level of education; (3) Upper secondary 
level of education; (4) Post-secondary, non-tertiary level of education; (5) First 
stage tertiary education; (6) Second stage of tertiary education (leading to an 
advanced research qualification) of education. 
 
Social Class (q114): RC: Working class, Lower middle class, Middle class, Upper 
middle class, Upper class. Other/Refused/DK coded to missing.  
 










Adshead, M. & Tonge, J. (2009) Politics in Ireland: convergence and divergence in a 
two-polity island, Palgrave and Macmillan  
Anderson, C. J. & Kaltenhaler, K. (1996) “The dynamics of public opinion toward 
European integration”, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, 
No. 2, pp. 175-199. 
Anderson, C. & Reichert, S. (1995) “Economic Benefits and Support for Membership 
in the EU: A Cross-national Analysis”, Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 15, No. 
3, pp. 231-49 
Bartels, L. M. (2008) Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded 
Age, Princeton University Press  
Bernhagen, P. & Chari, R. (2011) “Financial and Economic Crisis: Theoretical 
Explanations of the Global Sunset”, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 
455-472. 
Bollen, K. A. & Jackman, R. W. (1985) “Political Democracy and the Size 
Distribution Income”, American Sociological Review, Vol. 50, No. 4, pp. 438-
457 
Boomgaarden, H.G., Schuck, A. R. T., Elenbaas, M. & De Vreese, C. H. (2011) 
“Mapping EU Attitudes: Conceptual and empirical dimensions of 
Euroscepticism and EU support” European Union Politics Vol. 12, No. 2, pp. 
241-266. 
Brinegar, A.P., Jolly, S.K. & Kitschelt, H. (2004) “Varieties of capitalism and 
political divides over European integration” In G. Marks & M.R. Steenbergen, 
(eds.) European Integration and Political Conflict Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 62-93. 
Brinegar, A. & Jolly, S. (2005), “Location, Location, Location: National Contextual 
Factors & Public Support for European Integration”, European Union Politics, 
Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 157 
Carrubba, C.J. (2001) “The Electoral Connection in European Union Politics”, 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 63, No. 1, pp. 141-158 
Chari, R. & Bernhagen, P. (2011) “Financial and Economic Crisis: Explaining the 
Sunset over the Celtic Tiger”, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, pp. 473- 
488.  
Corneo, G. & Gruner, H. P. (2002) “Individual preferences for redistribution”, 
Journal of Politics, Vol. 83, No. 10, pp. 87-107  
Dalton, R. J. (2005) “The Social Transformation of Trust in Government” 
International Review of Sociology, Vol. 15, No. 1 pp. 133-154 
De Vreese, C. H. & Boomgaarden, H. G. (2005) “Projecting EU Referendums: Fear 
of Immigration and Support for the European Union”, European Union 
Politics, Vol. 6, No, 1, pp. 59-82 
Dellepaine, S. & Hardiman, N. (2012) “Governing the Irish Economy: a triple crisis”, 
in Irish Governance in Crisis, Hardiman, N. (ed.), Manchester: Manchester 
University Press   
Eichenberg, R. & Dalton, R. J. (1993), “Europeans and the European Community: 
The Dynamics of Public Support for European Integration”, International 
Organization, Vol. 47, No. 4, pp. 507-34.  
	 31	
Eurofound (2012) “Experiencing the economic crisis in the EU: changes in living 
standards, deprivation and trust” European Foundation for the Improvement of 
Living and Working Conditions, Available at: 
https://www.eurofound.europa.eu/sites/default/files/ef_files/pubdocs/2012/07/
en/1/EF1207EN.pdf Accessed: 28/09/17 
Franklin, M., Van der Eijk, C. & Marsh, M. (1995) “Referendum Outcomes and Trust 
in Government” Public Support for the Europe in the Wake of Maastricht”, 
West European Politics, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp. 101-117. 
Finseraas, H. (2012) “Poverty, ethnic minorities among the poor and preferences for 
redistribution in European regions”, Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 
22, No. 2, pp. 164 – 180  
Gabel, M. (1998a) “Public Support for European Integration: An Empirical Test of 
Five Theories”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 60, No. 2 pp.333-54 
Gabel, M. (1998b) “International Economics & Mass Politics: Market Liberalisation 
and Public Attitudes in the European Union”, American Journal of Political 
Research, Vol. 27, pp. 3-19 
Gabel, M. & Palmer, H. (1995) “Understanding Variation on Public Support for 
European Integration”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 27, No. 
1, pp. 3-19 
Gabel, M. & Whitten, G. (1997) “Economic Conditions, Economic Perceptions & 
Public Support for European Integration”, Political Behaviour, Vol. 19, No. 1 
p. 81-96 
Garry, J., Marsh, M., & Sinnott, R., (2005) ‘Second-Order versus Issue-voting effects 
in EU Referendums Evidence from the Nice Treaty Referendums”, European 
Union Politics, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 201-221  
Garry, J. (2013) “Direct Democracy and regional integration: Citizens’ perceptions of 
treaty implications and the Irish reversal on Lisbon”, European Journal of 
Political Research, Vol. 52, pp. 94-118. 
Gilland, K. (2002), “Ireland and European Integration”, in Goldmann, K. & Gilland, 
K. (eds.) Nationality versus Europeanisation: the view of the nation in four 
countries, Stockholm: Dept. of Political Sciences, Stockholm University, pp. 
166-84  
Glencross, A. & Trechsel, A. (2011) “First or Second order referendums? 
Understanding the votes on the EU Constitutional Treaty in Four EU Member 
States”, West European Politics, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 755-722 
Holmes, M. (2005) “Irish Approaches to European Integration”, in Holmes, M. (ed.) 
Ireland and the European Union, pp. 1-14 
Hussey, G. (1993) Ireland Today: Anatomy of a Changing State London: Penguin 
Kaltenhaler, K., Ceccoli, S. & Gellneny, R. (2008) “Attitudes toward eliminating 
income inequality in Europe”, European Union Politics, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 
217-241 
Kennedy, R. & Sinnott, R. (2006), “Irish Social and Political Cleavages” in Garry, J. 
& Payne, D. (eds.) Irish Social and Political Attitudes, pp. 78-94 
Kennedy, R. & Sinnott, R. (2007), “Irish Public Opinion towards European 
Integration”, Irish Political Studies, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 61-81 
Kenworthy, L. & McCall, L. (2008) “Inequality, public opinion and redistribution”, 
Socioeconomic Review, Vol. 6 pp. 35 - 68 
Kirby, P. & Murphy, M. P. (2011) Towards a Second Republic: Irish politics after the 
Celtic Tiger, (Pluto: Ireland) 
	 32	
Kriesi, H. Grande, E., Lachat, R., Dolszal, M., Bornschier, S., & Frey, T. (2008) West 
European Politics in the Age of Globalisation Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 
Kuhn, T. & Stoeckel, F. (2014) “When European Integration becomes costly: the euro 
crisis and public support for European economic governance” Journal of European 
Public Policy, Vol. 21, No. 4, pp 624-641. 
Laffan, B. & O’Mahony, J. (2008) Ireland and the European Union, Palgrave 
Macmillan 
Lyons, P. (2008) Public Opinion, Politics in Contemporary Ireland, Irish Academic 
Press  
Loveless, M. Rohrschneider, R. (2008) ‘Public Perceptions of the EU as a System of 
Governance”, Living Reviews in European Governance, Vol. 3, No. 1 pp. 34- 
Loveless, M. (2010) “Agreeing in Principle: Utilitarianism & Economic Values as 
Support for the European Union in Central & Eastern Europe, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, Vol. 48, No. 4, pp. 1083-1106 
Matthews, A. (1983) “The Economic Consequences of EEC Membership for Ireland” 
in Coombes, D. (ed.) Ireland and the European Communities: Ten Years of 
Membership Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, pp. 110-132 
McClaren, L. (2002) “Public Support for the European Union: Cost/Benefit Analysis 
or perceived Cultural Threat?” Journal of Politics, Vol. 64, No. 2 pp.551-6 
McLaren, L. (2004), “Opposition to European Integration and Fear of Loss of 
National Identity: Debunking a Basic Assumption Regarding Hostility to the 
Integration Project”, European Journal of Political Research, Vol. 43, No. 6, 
pp. 895-911. 
Norris, P. (ed.) (1999) Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Governance, 
Oxford University Press.  
Rehm, P. (2009) “Risks and Redistribution: an individual-level analysis”, 
Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 42, No. 7, pp. 855-81 
Reuveny, R. & Li, Q. (2003) “Economic Openness, democracy and income 
inequality: an empirical analysis’ Comparative Political Studies, Vol. 36, NO. 
5, pp. 575-601 
Rohrschneider, R. (2002) “The Democracy Deficit & Mass Support for an EU-wide 
Government” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 463-
76  
Rohrschneider, R. & Loveless, M. (2010), “Macro Salience: How Economic and 
Political Contexts Mediate Popular Evaluations of the Democracy Deficit in 
the European Union”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 72, No. 4, pp. 1029-1045. 
Rohrschneider, R. & Whitefield, S. (2006) “Political Parties, Public Opinion and 
European Integration in Post-Communist Countries: The State of the Art”, 
European Union Politics, Vol. 7, pp. 141-160 
Simpson, K. & Loveless, M. (2016) “Another Chance? Concerns about Inequality, 
Support for the European Union and Further European Integration, Journal of 
European Public Policy, Vol. 24, Issue 7, pp. 1069 -1089 
Sinnott, R. (1995) Knowledge of the European Union in Irish Public Opinion: 
Sources and Implications, Institute of European Affairs (IEA), Occasional 
Paper No. 5 (Dublin Institute European Affairs) 
Sinnott, R. (2002) “Cleavages, Parties & Referendums: Relationships Between 
Representative and Direct Democracy in the Republic of Ireland”, European 
Journal of Political Research, Vol. 41, pp. 820-824 
	 33	
Sinnott, R. (2005) “Uphill Task to Win EU Treaty Poll Here”, The Irish Times, 14th 
June 2005   
Szelenyi, I. & Kostello, E. (1996) “The Market transition debate: toward a 
synthesis?”, American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 101, No. 4, pp. 1082-1096 
Whitefield, S. & Loveless, M. (2013) “Social Inequality and Social Conflict: 
Evidence from the New Democracies of Central and Easter Europe”, Europe-
Asia Studies, Vol. 65, No. 1, pp. 26-44  
 
 
 
 
